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Abstract
We present a general framework for proving polynomial sample complexity bounds for the problem of learning
from samples the best auction in a class of “simple” auctions. Our framework captures all of the most prominent
examples of “simple” auctions, including anonymous and non-anonymous item and bundle pricings, with either a
single or multiple buyers. The technique we propose is to break the analysis of auctions into two natural pieces. First,
one shows that the set of allocation rules have large amounts of structure; second, fixing an allocation on a sample,
one shows that the set of auctions agreeing with this allocation on that sample have revenue functions with low
dimensionality. Our results effectively imply that whenever it’s possible to compute a near-optimal simple auction
with a known prior, it is also possible to compute such an auction with an unknown prior (given a polynomial number
of samples).
1 Introduction
The standard economic approach for designing revenue-maximizing auctions assumes all information unknown to the
designer is drawn from some prior distribution, about which the designer has perfect information. With this “perfect”
prior in hand, the designer fine-tunes an auction to optimize for her expected revenue over draws of the unknown
information from the prior. While this model allows for quite strong results relating her chosen auction’s revenue to
the optimal revenue, three related difficulties arise from using this design pattern in practice. First, for any particular
setting, it is unlikely that the designer could actually formulate a perfect prior over the market’s hidden information.
Second, if the market designer has an imperfect prior, it is possible that her optimal auction has overfit to this prior
and will have very poor revenue when run on the (similar) true prior. Finally, the optimal auction for a particular prior
can be quite complicated and unintuitive.
These obstacles can be addressed in a rigorous manner by designing auctions as a function of several samples of
the unknown data (usually, buyers’ valuations) drawn from an unknown distribution, with the knowledge that our goal
is to earn high revenue on a fresh draw from the same distribution. It is reasonable to expect that experienced sellers
have previous records of the bids made by previous participants in their market. Moreover, if an auction is guaranteed
perform well on future draws from a distribution to which it only had sample access, it will have strong generalization
properties if its sample size was sufficiently large.
How many samples are necessary to achieve such a guarantee? The answer depends upon the complexity of the
set of auctions the seller might select. The more complex the class of auctions, the lower the class’s “representation
error” (the higher the revenue the seller might be able to extract); on the other hand, a more complex class of auctions
will have higher “generalization error” (loss in revenue from optimizing over the sample rather than the true prior) for
a fixed sample size.
The mechanism design community has placed “simplicity” as a design goal for its own sake for single-parameter (Hart-
line and Roughgarden, 2009) and multi-parameter (Chawla et al., 2007, 2010; Babaioff et al., 2014; Rubinstein and
Weinberg, 2015) auctions.1 Recent work (Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015) proposed the use of a class’s pseudo-
1A canonical “single-parameter” problem is a single-item auction — each bidder either “wins” or “loses”. A canonical “multi-parameter”
problem is a multi-item auction — with k items, each bidder faces 2k different possibilities. Multi-parameter problems are well known to be much
more ill-behaved than single-parameter problems. For example, there is no general multi-parameter analog of Myerson’s (single-parameter) theory
of revenue-maximizing auctions Myerson (1981).
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dimension as a formal notion of simplicity for single-parameter auctions, and proves for general single-parameter
settings there exist classes of auctions with small representation error (which contain a nearly-optimal auction) and
have small pseudo-dimension or generalization error (a polynomial-sized sample suffices to learn a nearly-optimal
auction from that class).
In this work, we give a general framework for bounding the pseudo-dimension of classes of multi-parameter
auctions. Our results imply polynomial sample complexity bounds for revenue maximization over all of the afore-
mentioned “simple” auctions. In effect, our results imply that whenever it’s possible to compute a near-optimal simple
auction with a known prior, it is also possible to compute such an auction with an unknown prior (given a polynomial
number of samples).
One concrete example of a class of well-studied “simple” multi-parameter auctions comes from Babaioff et al.
(2014). Consider a single bidder whose valuation is additive over k items: there is a vector v ∈ Rk such that the
bidder’s valuation for a bundle B ⊆ [k] is
∑
j∈B vj . An item pricing is defined by a vector p ∈ Rk, and offers the
agent any bundle B for price
∑
j∈B pj . A grand bundle pricing is defined by a single real number q ∈ R and offers
the bundle B = [k] for the price q. When a single additive buyer’s valuation v ∼ D1 × · · · × Dk is drawn from a
product distribution, either the best item pricing or the best grand-bundle pricing will earn 1/6 of optimal revenue.
Babaioff et al. (2014) assume that the Dj’s are known a priori and choose item and bundle prices as a function of
the distributions. Can we instead learn from samples the best auction from the class consisting of all item and bundle
prices? The main result in Babaioff et al. (2014) provides a bound on the representation error of this class; our work
provides the first sample complexity bound (for this and many other classes).
Our Main Results We present a general framework for bounding sample complexity for “simple” combinatorial
auctions, when considering auctions as functions from valuations to revenue. Formally, we study the following ques-
tion, and provide a technique for answering it in many interesting cases:
Given a class of multiparameter auctions C : Vn → R (each auction maps any n-tuple of combinatorial
valuations to the revenue achieved by the auction on those valuations), how large must m be such that the
empirical revenue maximizer in C over m samples drawn from D earns OPT (C) − ǫ expected revenue
on fresh sample drawn from D?
Our main technical contributions are first to show a general way to measure the sample complexity of single-
buyer mechanisms, which are interesting in their own right, and second to show a reduction in bounding the sample
complexity for the multi-buyer auctions to bounding the sample complexity of single-buyer auctions. This reduction
and our general framework apply to all known multi-buyer simple auctions from the literature. We then instantiate
this framework and show that it is flexible enough to bound the sample complexity of a large class of simple auction
classes from the literature. In particular, we bound the pseudo-dimension of item pricings, grand bundle pricings, and
second-price item or bundle auctions with reserves, covering the set of known simple auctions which approximately
optimize revenue. The following table summarizes our results, as well as the known approximation guarantees these
auctions provide. We note that Theorem D.1 is proven using a direct argument rather than this framework.
Summary of Simple Auction Properties
Class Valuations PD anon, nonanon Rev APX anonymous Rev APX nonanonymous
Grand bundle pricing General O(1), O(n)
Corollary 4.3
Item Pricing General O˜(k2), O˜(k2n),
Corollary 4.4
3 (1 unit-demand bidder)
(Chawla et al., 2007)
10.7 (n unit-demand bidders)
(Chawla et al., 2010)
Item and Grand Bun-
dle Pricing
General O˜(k2), O˜(k2n) 6 (1 additive bidder)
(Babaioff et al., 2014)
312 (1 subadditive bidder)
(Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2015)
Additive O˜(k), O˜(kn),
Theorem D.1
Second-price item
auctions with item
reserves
Additive O˜(k2), O˜(k2n),
Corollary 4.5
48 (n additive buyers),
(Yao, 2015)
O˜(k), O˜(kn),
Theorem D.1
2
These results imply that a polynomial-sized sample suffices to learn a nearly-optimal auction from these classes
of simple auctions. Thus, when combined with results from the literature, it is possible to learn auctions which earn a
constant-factor of optimal revenue for a single additive (Babaioff et al., 2014) or subadditive bidder (Rubinstein and
Weinberg, 2015), n unit-demand bidders (Chawla et al., 2010), and n additive bidders (Yao, 2015).2
For many classes of auctions, our sample complexity bounds do not rely on any structural assumptions about
buyers’ valuations (only that their utilities are quasilinear in money and that they will behave by maximizing their own
utility). We point to this flexibility as a key feature of our techniques: for bidders with general valuation functions, it
can be quite complicated to reason about bidder’s behavior directly. We also formally describe the allocations of these
auction classes as coming from sequential allocation procedures all drawn from the same class, and show any class
which has allocations which can be described this way also has a provably simple class of allocation functions. This
reduction may be of independent interest for proving other classes of auctions have small sample complexity.
1.1 Related Work
There has been a recent surge in the design of single-parameter revenue-maximizing auctions3 from samples (Elkind,
2007; Balcan et al., 2007, 2008a; Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Medina and Mohri, 2014; Rough-
garden and Schrijvers, 2015; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Devanur et al., 2015); we focus here on the prob-
lem of designing auctions from samples for multi-parameter settings. Optimal auctions for combinatorial settings are
substantially more complex than for single-parameter settings, even before introducing questions of sample complex-
ity. Item pricings in particular have been the subject of much study with respect to their constant approximations
when buyers’ values for items are independent,4 for welfare (Kelso Jr and Crawford, 1982; Feldman et al., 2015) and
revenue in the worst-case for for a single (Chawla et al., 2007) and n unit-demand bidders (Chawla et al., 2010), a
single (Babaioff et al., 2014) additive buyers, and a single subadditive buyer (Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2015).5 For
the additive and subadditive buyer results, the theorems state that the better of the best item pricing and best grand
bundle pricing achieve a constant factor of optimal revenue. Combining the result of Babaioff et al. (2014) and a
recent result of Yao (2015), it is possible to earn a constant factor of optimal revenue for n additive buyers using the
better of the best grand bundle pricing and an auction format related to item pricing (the second-price item auction
with item-specific reserve prices). All n-buyer results for revenue rely on the use of nonanonymous item and grand
bundle pricings. These results can be thought of as bounding the representation error of using these classes of auc-
tions for revenue maximization; our work can be thought of as complementing these results by bounding the classes’
generalization error.
Item pricings are also sufficiently simple that the sample complexity of choosing welfare-optimal (Feldman et al.,
2015; Hsu et al., 2016) and revenue-optimal (Balcan et al., 2008a) item pricings has been explored. Balcan et al.
(2008a) study the sample complexity of anonymous item pricing for combinatorial auctions with unlimited supply
and employ one technique which bears some resemblance to our framework. Fixing a sample of size m, they bound
the number of distinct allocation labelings L of that sample by anonymous item pricing using a geometric interpre-
tation of anonymous pricings. Such an argument seems difficult to extend to other classes of auctions (for example,
nonanonymous item pricings). We ultimately suggest the use of linear separability as a tool to bound L, an argument
which applies to many distinct classes of auctions with finite supply, and doesn’t rely on the particular geometry of
anonymous item pricings.
We use the concept of linear separability (Daniely and Shalev-Shwartz, 2014) to prove bounds on the pseudo-
dimension of many classes of auctions; this tool was also used by Balcan et al. (2014) in studying the sample com-
plexity of learning the valuation function of a single buyer when goods are divisible and the valuation functions are
either additive, Leontiff, or Separable Piecewise-Linear Concave; our results apply to multiple bidders, when items are
2Our framework also applies to learning simple auctions with good welfare guarantees, as in Feldman et al. (2015); all that changes is the
real-valued function associated with an auction. Welfare guarantees are simpler than revenue guarantees (since the objective function value depends
on the allocation only) so we concentrate on the latter.
3A generalization of single-item auctions, where each buyer can be described by a single real number representing her value for being selected
as a winner.
4Dughmi et al. (2014) show that when items’ values are allowed to be correlated, for a single unit-demand bidder, the sample complexity required
to compute a constant-factor approximation to the optimal auction is necessarily exponential (in m).
5For more general valuation profiles and without item-wise independence, it is known that item pricings can also achieve super-constant revenue
approximations, see Balcan et al. (2008b); Chakraborty et al. (2013).
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indivisible, and most of them to arbitrary valuation classes (including superadditive valuations). Hsu et al. (2016) also
studied the linear separability and used it to bound the pseudo-dimension of welfare maximization for item pricings as
well as the concentration of demand for any particular good.
2 Preliminaries
Bayesian Mechanism Design Preliminaries In this section, we provide the definitions and main results regarding
simple multi-parameter mechanism design necessary for proving our main results. We consider the problem of selling
k heterogeneous items to n bidders. Each bidder i ∈ [n] can be described by a combinatorial valuation function
vi ∈ V ⊆ (2k → R), and is assumed to be quasilinear in money, meaning that her utility for a bundle B with price
p(B) is exactly ui(B, p) = vi(B) − p(B). We will assume all valuation functions are monotone, v(B) ≤ v(B′) for
all B ⊆ B′. An auction A is comprised of an allocation rule A1 : Vn → [n]k and a payment rule A2 : Vn → Rn.
We will only consider direct revelation mechanisms, for which it is the best-response for any buyer to reveal vi to any
mechanismA. The valuation function vi is assumed to be known to agent i but not to the designer of the auction, who
must choose an auction A before observing v1, . . . , vn.
We will assume that bidder i’s valuation is drawn independently from some distributionDi over valuation profiles.
We assume the support of the distribution D = D1 × . . . × Dn is in [0, H ]n. We will refer to the revenue of an
auction A on a particular instance v = (v1, . . . , vn) as
∑
iA2(v)i, and the (expected) revenue of A as REV(A,D) =
Ev∼D[
∑
iA2(v)i]. When a bidder’s valuation vi can be represented as vi1, . . . , vik such that vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vij , we
say that i is additive; when vi can be represented as k numbers vi1, . . . , vik such that vi(S) = maxj∈S vij , we say
that i is unit-demand. If, for all S, T ⊆ [k], vi(S) + vi(T ) ≥ vi(S ∪ T ), we say vi is subadditive.
Several particular kinds of auctions are of particular use when (approximately) optimizing for revenue in multi-
parameter settings. An auction is an (anonymous) item pricing if it sets price pj for each item j ∈ [k], and offers
buyers in some fixed order any bundle B of remaining items for price
∑
j∈B pj ; each buyer then chooses the bundle
maximizing her utility. An auction is a non-anonymous item pricing if it sets price pij for each j ∈ [k], i ∈ [n], and
offers buyers in some fixed order any bundle B of remaining items; buyer i will be offered B for a price of
∑
j∈B pij .
An anonymous (or nonanonymous) grand bundle pricing sets a single price p (pi) for the “grand” bundle [k] of all
items, and offers the grand bundle to buyers in some fixed order until the grand bundle is sold. Throughout the paper,
we will assume this fixed order is fixed (namely, not a parameter of the design space), and that it places bidder 1 first
in the ordering, 2 second, and so on. When buyers are additive, we will also consider the second-price item auction,
which sells each item to the highest bidder for that item at the second-highest bid for that item, and the second-price
grand bundle auction which sells the grand bundle to the highest bidder for it at the second-highest bid. Finally, we
will consider the second-price item (grand-bundle) auction with both anonymous and non-anonymous item reserves,
which sell to the highest bidder for that item at the maximum of the second-highest bid and the item’s reserve (for that
bidder), or to no one if the highest bidder’s bid is below her reserve. These auction classes achieve constant-factor
approximations for revenue in many special cases: for one (Chawla et al., 2007) and n (Chawla et al., 2010) unit-
demand bidders, for one (Babaioff et al., 2014) and n (Yao, 2015) bidders, and for one subadditive bidder (Rubinstein
and Weinberg, 2015) (see Section C, where we have included the formal theorem statements for completeness).
Learning Theory Preliminaries In this section, we provide definitions and useful tools for bounding the sample
complexity of learning a class of real-valued functions F . We omit discussion of binary-labeled learning and the
definitions of uniform versus PAC learning for reasons of space (see Section B for further details).
Real-Valued Labels Both PAC learnability and uniform learnability of binary-valued functions can be well-characterized
in terms of the class’s VC dimension. When learning real-valued functions (for example, to guarantee convergence of
the revenue of various auctions), we use a real-valued analog to VC dimension (which will give a sufficient but not
necessary condition for uniform convergence). We will work with the pseudo-dimension (Pollard, 1984), one standard
generalization. Formally, let c : V → [0, H ] be a real-valued function over V , and F be the class we are learning
over. Let S be a sample drawn from D, |N | = m, labeled according to c. Both the empirical and true error of a
hypothesis cˆ are defined as before, though |cˆ(v) − c(v)| can now take on values in [0, H ] rather than in {0, 1}. Let
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(r1, . . . , rm) ∈ [0, H ]m be a set of targets for N . We say (r1, . . . , rm) witnesses the shattering of N by F if, for each
T ⊆ N , there exists some cT ∈ F such that cT (vq) ≥ rq for all vq ∈ T and cT (vq) < rq for all vq /∈ T . If there exists
some ~r witnessing the shattering of N , we say N is shatterable by F . The pseudo-dimension of F , denoted PD(F),
is the size of the largest set S which is shatterable by F . We will derive sample complexity upper bounds from the
following theorem, which connects the sample complexity of uniform learning over a class of real-valued functions to
the pseudo-dimension of the class.
Theorem 2.1 (E.g. Anthony and Bartlett (1999)) Suppose F is a class of real-valued functions with range in [0, H ]
and pseudo-dimension PD(F). For every ǫ > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], the sample complexity of (ǫ, δ)-uniformly learning the
class F is
n = O
((
H
ǫ
)2(
PD(F) ln
H
ǫ
+ ln
1
δ
))
.
Moreover, a conceptually simple algorithm achieves the guarantee in Theorem 2.1: simply output the function c ∈ F
with the smallest empirical error on the sample. These algorithms are called empirical risk minimizers.
Multi-Labeled Learning The main goal of our work is to bound the sample complexity of revenue maximization
for multi-parameter classes of auctions (via bounding these classes’ pseudo-dimension); our proofs first bound the
number of labelings of purchased bundles which these auctions can induce on a sample of size m. Then, we argue
about the behavior of the revenue of all auctions which agree on the purchased bundles for every sample to bound the
pseudo-dimension. Since bundles are neither binary nor real-valued, we now briefly mention several tools which we
use for learning in the so-called multi-label setting.
The first of these tools is that of compression schemes for a class of functions.
Definition 2.2 A compression scheme for F : V → Y , of size d consists of
• a compression function
compress : (V × Y)m → (V × Y)d,
where compress(N) ⊆ N and d ≤ m; and
• a decompression function
decompress : (V × Y)d → F .
For any f ∈ F and any sample (v1, f(v1)), . . . , (vm, f(vm)), the functions satisfy
decompress ◦ compress((v1, f(v1)), . . . , (vm, f(vm))) = f ′ ∈ F
where f ′(vq) = f(vq) for each q ∈ [m].
Intuitively, a compression function selects a subset of d “most relevant” points from a sample, and based on
these points, the decompression scheme selects a hypothesis. When such a scheme exists, the learning algorithm
decompress ◦ compress is an empirical risk minimizer. Furthermore, this compression-based learning algorithm
has sample complexity bounded by a function of d, which plays a role analogous to VC dimension in the sample
complexity guarantees.
Theorem 2.3 (Littlestone and Warmuth (1986)) Suppose F has a compression scheme of size d. Then, the PAC
complexity of F is at most m = O
(
d ln 1
ǫ
+ln 1
δ
ǫ
)
.
While compression schemes imply useful sample complexity bounds, it can be hard to show that a particular
hypothesis class admits a compression scheme. One general technique is to show that the class is linearly separable in
a higher-dimensional space.
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Definition 2.4 A class F is d-dimensionally linearly separable if there exists a function ψ : V ×Y → Rd and for any
f ∈ F , there exists some wf ∈ Rd with f(v) ∈ argmaxy〈wf , ψ(v, y)〉 and |argmaxy〈wf , ψ(v, y)〉| = 1.
It is known that a d-dimensional linearly separable class admits a compression scheme of size d.
Theorem 2.5 (Theorem 5 of Daniely and Shalev-Shwartz (2014)) Suppose F is d-dimensionally linearly separa-
ble. Then, there exists a compression scheme for F of size d.
If a class is linearly separable, this greatly restricts the number of labelings it can induce on a sample of size m, a trick
used in Hsu et al. (2016) and also in the next section of this paper.
We also briefly mention that if a class F is linearly separable, post-processing the class with a fixed function also
yields a linearly separable class over the resulting label space.
Observation 1
Suppose F is d-dimensionally linearly separable over Q. Fix some q : Q→ Q′. Then, the set q ◦ F = {q ◦ f |f ∈ F}
is d-dimensionally linearly separable over Q′.
With these tools in hand, our roadmap is as follows: for a class of auctions, we first prove that the class (which
labels valuations by utility-maximizing bundles purchased) is linearly separable, which then implies an upper-bound
on how many distinct bundle labelings one can have for a fixed sample. Then, we argue about the pseudo-dimension
of the class (which labels a valuation by the revenue achieved when that agent buys her utility-maximizing bundle) by
considering only those auctions which all have the same bundle labeling of m samples and arguing about the behavior
of revenue of those auctions.
3 A Framework for Bounding Pseudo-dimension Via Intermediate Discrete
Labels
We now propose a new framework for bounding the pseudo-dimension of many well-structured classes of real-valued
functions. Suppose F is some set of real-valued functions whose pseudo-dimension we wish to bound. Suppose that,
for each f ∈ F , f can be “factored” into a pair of functions (f1, f2) such that f2(f1(x), x) = f(x) for any x. There
are always “trivial” factorings, where the function f2 = f or f1(x) = x, but the interesting case arises when both
f1(x) and f2 (fixing f1(x)) depend in a very limited way upon x. In particular, if the set of functions {f1} are very
structured, and fixing f1(x) the set of functions {f2} only depend upon x in some very mild way, this will imply that
F itself has small pseudo-dimension. Intuitively, this will allow us to “bucket” functions by their values according to
f1 on some sample, and bound the pseudo-dimension of each of those buckets separately.
Our particular technique for showing such a property is first to show that the set of functions {f1} are linearly
separable in a dimensions, then to fix some sample S of size m and some f1, and to upper-bound by b the pseudo-
dimension of the set of functions f2 whose associated f ′1 agrees with the labeling of f1 on S. The following definition
captures precisely what we mean when we say that the function class F factors into these two other classes of func-
tions. If f1(x) reveals too much about x, it will be difficult to prove linear separability; similarly, if f2 depends too
heavily on x, it will be difficult to prove a bucket has small pseudo-dimension.
Definition 3.1 ((a, b)-factorable class) Consider some F = {f : X → R}. Suppose, for each f ∈ F , there exists
(f1, f2), f1 : X → Y, f2 : Y × X → R such that f2(f1(x), x) = f(x) for every x ∈ X . Let
F1 = {f1 : (f1, f2) is a decomposition of some f ∈ F}
and
F2 = {f2 : (f1, f2) is a decomposition of some f ∈ F}.
The set F (a, b)-factors over Q if:
(1) F1 is a-dimensionally linearly separable over Q ⊆ Y .
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(2) For every f1 ∈ F1 and sample S ⊂ X of size m, the set
F2|f1(S) = {f
′
2 : X → R, f
′
2(x) = f2(f
′
1(x), x)|f1(S) = f
′
1(S) and (f ′1, f2) is a decomposition of some f ∈ F}
has pseudo-dimension at most b.
We now give an example of a simple class which satisfies this definition. One could easily bound the pseudo-
dimension of this example class using a direct shattering argument, but it will be instructive to work through our
definition of (a, b)-separability.
Example 3.2 Fix some set G = {g1, . . . , gk} ⊂ Rk. Suppose F = {f : f(x) = maxg∈Gf⊆G g · x} is the set of
all functions which take the maximum of at most k common linear functions in a fixed set G. We will show that F
(kd, O˜(kd))-factors over [k], where each j ∈ [k] will represent which of the k linear functions is maximizing for a
particular input. That is, for some f,Gf ⊆ G, let f1(x) = argmaxt:gt∈Gf gt · x and f2(t, x) = gt · x. Thus, we have a
valid factoring:
f2(f1(x), x) = f2(argmaxt:gt∈Gf gt · x, x) = gargmaxt:gt∈Gf gt·x · x = maxgt∈Gf
gt · x = f(x).
It remains to show that F1 is d-dimensionally linearly separable and to bound the pseudo-dimension of F2|f1 . We start
with the former. Let Ψ(x, t)t′j = I[t′ = t] · xj for t′ ∈ [k], j ∈ [d]. Then, let wftj = I[gt ∈ Gf ] · gtj . The dot product
will then be
Ψ(x, t) · wf =
∑
t′
I[t′ = t] · I[gt′ ∈ Gf ]gt′ · x
which will be maximized when t = argmaxt′:gt′∈Gf gt′ · x, or when t = f1(x). So, F1 is linearly separable in kd
dimensions over [k].
Now, fix f1 ∈ F1; we will show the pseudo-dimension of F2|f1 is at most O˜(kd). For any fixed sample S =
(x1, . . . , xm), f1(x
t) is fixed for all t ∈ [m], implying that the input to all f2 ∈ F2|f1 , (f1(xt), xt), is fixed. Finally,
by definition of f ′2,
f ′2(x
t) = f2(f1(x
t), xt) = gf1(xt) · x
t.
Thus, for each j ∈ [k], the subset Sj ⊆ S for which f1(xt) = j for all xt ∈ Sj , f ′2 is just a linear function in d
dimensions of xt with coefficients gj , Thus, since linear functions in d dimensions have pseudo-dimension at most
d+ 1, there are at most md+1 labelings which can be induced on Sj , and at most mk(d+1) labelings of all of S. This
implies PD(F2|f1) is at most O˜(kd).
We now present the main theorem about the pseudo-dimension of classes which are (a, b)-factorable. The proof of
this theorem first exploits the fact that linearly separable classes have a “small” number of possible outputs for a sample
of size m. Then, fixing the output of the linearly separable function, the second set of functions’ pseudo-dimension is
small. The proof of the theorem is relegated to the appendix due to space considerations.
Theorem 3.3 Suppose F is (a, b)-factorable over Q. Then,
PD(F) = O (max ((a+ b) ln(a+ b), a ln |Q|)) .
Intuitively, when F1 is linearly separable in a dimensions, it can induce at most ma|Q|a many labelings of m
samples, and fixing such a sample and its labeling, because F2 has pseudo-dimension at most b, it can induce at most
mb labelings of m samples with respect to their thresholds.
While the range of F1 might be all of Q, it will regularly be helpful to only need to prove linear separability of
F1 only over “realizable” labels for particular inputs. If F1 has the property that for every input x, every f1 ∈ F1
labels x with one of a smaller set of labels Qx ( Q, then it suffices to prove linear separability for x over Qx. The
following remark makes this claim formal; its proof can be found in Section E. So, we will be able to focus on proving
linear separability of F1 over a label space which depends upon the inputs x. This will be particularly useful when
describing auctions in the next section, whose allocations are in certain cases highly restricted by their inputs.
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Remark 3.4 Suppose for each x ∈ X , there exists some Qx ⊆ Q such that f1(x) ∈ Qx ⊆ Q for all f1 ∈ F1,
and that for for each x, F1 is linearly separable in a dimensions for that x over Qx. Assume there is a subset of
dimension T+ ⊆ [a] for which wf
t∈T+ ≥ 0 and
∑
t∈T+ w
f
t > 0 for all f . Suppose that for all x ∈ X, f ∈ F1,
maxy∈Qx Ψ(x, y) · w
f ≥ 0. Then, F1 is linearly separable over Q in a dimensions as well.
4 Consequences for Learning Simple Auctions
We now present applications of the framework provided by Theorem 3.3 to prove bounds on the pseudo-dimension
for many classes of “simple” mechanisms. The implication is that these classes, which have been shown in many
special cases to have small representation error also have have small generalization error when auctions are chosen
after observing a polynomially sized sample. We now describe how one can translate a class of auctions into a class of
functions which has an obvious and useful factorization. An auction A : Vn → [n]k × [0, H ]n has two components,
its allocation function A1 : Vn → [n]k and its revenue function A2 : Vn → [0, H ]n. We will abuse notation and refer
to A2(v) =
∑
iA(v)2i as the revenue function for an auction. Our goal is to bound the sample complexity of picking
some high-revenue function from a class. All omitted proofs are found in Section E. For the remainder of this section
we use F to represent a class of auctions, f ∈ F to represent a particular auction, and F1,F2 to be the corresponding
allocation functions and revenue functions which result from this decomposition. When F1 is linearly separable, this
implies there can only be so many distinct allocations possible for a fixed set of valuation profiles S, and when F2
(fixing some allocation for S) has small pseudo-dimension, the class of auctions itself has small pseudo-dimension.
This “trivial” decomposition of an auction’s revenue function describes its revenue function as a function of both
the allocation chosen by f1 ∈ F1 for v and the valuation profile v. Since A2 is a function only of v, there is clearly
enough information in (f1(v),v) to computeA2(v) (one can simply ignore f1(v) and output f2(f1(v),v) = A2(v)).
The reason we consider this decomposition is that fixing an allocation, revenue functions of simple auctions are
generally very simple to describe as a function of the input valuation profile v. If one fixes the allocation choice for a
sample S ofm valuations, many auctions’ classes of revenue functions are either constant functions on S which do not
depend upon v at all (for example, a posted price auction for a single item offered to a single bidder earns its posted
price if the item sells and 0 when the item doesn’t sell, both of which are constants when the allocation is fixed) or
depends only in a very mild way (for example, a second-price single-item auction with a reserve earns the maximum
of its reserve and the second-highest bid when the item sells and 0 when it doesn’t).
Most of the “simple” auctions with multiple buyers and items that have been considered are sequential auctions
which interact with buyers “one at a time”: first, bidder 1 is offered a menu of several possible allocations at different
prices, she chooses some bundle, then bidder 2 is offered one of several allocations of the remaining items, and so
on. We assume for the remainder of the paper that there are no ties, (that is, there are no menus or bidders for which
|argmaxBu(B)| > 1.6 These auctions are simple enough that they can actually be run in practice, and yet expressive
enough that in many cases can earn constant fractions of the optimal revenue.
We next work toward a general reduction, from bounding the sample complexity of sequential auctions (with
multiple buyers) to that of single-buyer problems. The following definition captures two particularly common forms
of these auctions. The first definition captures the setting where the function selecting the menu to bidder i may
depend upon i’s identity; the second refers to when the menu is anonymous: what may be offered to bidder i can be
different than what is offered to bidder i′, but only due to the differences in bids vi, vi′ and the remaining available
items Xi(v), Xi′ (v).
For example, consider a single item for sale. Suppose n buyers are approached in some fixed order and bidder i is
offered the item at price pi if no earlier buyer has purchased the item. If pi = pi′ for all i, i′ ∈ [n], then the auction
applied to each buyer is the same, and we say this auction applies an n-wise repeated allocation associated with a
single posted price. If pi 6= pi′ for some i, i′ ∈ [n], then the allocation function applied to each bidder is an allocation
rule associated with some single posted price, though the particular posted price and therefore the allocation function
varies from bidder to bidder; this auction’s allocation is therefore an n-wise sequential allocation drawn from the class
of posted prices.
6We elide further discussion on this technical point, though we note it is possible to encode a tie-breaking rule over utility-maximizing bundles
in a way which is linearly separable (see Hsu et al. (2016) for more details).
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For a slightly more complex example, consider a set of k heterogeneous items [k] for sale to n bidders. Consider
an auction which sets a price pij for each item j ∈ [k] and each bidder i ∈ [n], and serves bidders in some fixed
order. Bidder i is offered any bundle B for which no item has been selected by some previous bidder at price pi(B) =∑
j∈B pij . This allocation is reached by applying a posted item pricing allocation to each buyer in turn, so these
allocations are n-wise sequential allocations drawn from posted item pricing allocations. If pij = pi′j for all j ∈ [k]
and all i, i′ ∈ [n], then the same allocation rule is being applied to all bidders, and the overall allocation is therefore
an n-wise anonymous sequential allocation rule.
Definition 4.1 (n-fold anonymous and nonanonymous sequential allocations) Let H be some class with h : V ×
{0, 1}k → Q for all h ∈ H and some Q ⊆ {0, 1}k. For some n functions h1, . . . , hn ∈ H and every v ∈ Vn,
inductively define X1(v) = [k], Xi(v) = Xi−1(v) \ hi−1(vi−1, Xi−1(v)). Then, define the n-wise product function∏
(h1,...,hn)
to be ∏
(h1,...,hn)
(v) = (h1(v1, X1(v)), h2(v2, X2(v)), . . . hn(vn, Xn(v))).
Then, we call any such function an n-wise nonanonymous sequential allocation drawn from H, or n-wise sequential
allocation drawn from H for short. If h1 = h2 = . . . = hn, we call
∏
h1,...,hn
an n-wise anonymous sequential
allocation drawn from H.
The sets X1, . . . , Xn correspond to the sets of remaining available items for each bidder after the previous bidders
have purchased their bundles according to their allocation functions: what is remaining for bidder i is whatever bidder
i − 1 had available less whatever was allocated to bidder i − 1. The two previous examples fit into this scenario
perfectly. The per-bidder allocation functions are fixed up-front: the allocation rules brought about by (anonymous) a
price for a single item or (anonymous) prices for each item. In some fixed order, the bidders are allocated according
to their allocation rule run on their valuation and the remaining items, and whatever items they didn’t purchase are
available for the next bidder and her allocation rule. When the prices don’t depend on the index i, the allocation
function for each bidder is the same, so those cases correspond to n-wise anonymous sequential allocation rules.
In the event that some class of auctions’ allocation functionsF1 are made up of n-wise sequential allocations from
a class H which is linearly separable, the linear separability is imparted upon F1. This intuition is made formal by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose F is a class of auctions, and let F1 : Vn → Q ⊆ [n]k be their (feasible) allocation function.
Suppose F1 is a set of n-wise sequential allocations from some H which is a-dimensionally linearly separable, whose
dot products are upper-bounded by H . Then F1 is an-dimensionally linearly separable. Similarly, if F1 is a set of
n-wise anonymous sequential allocations drawn from H which is a-dimensionally linearly separable, then F1 is also
a-dimensionally linearly separable.
Roughly speaking, this proof takes the maps guaranteed by linear separability of H and concatenates them n times,
“blowing up” the relative importance of the earlier bidders with large coefficients.
We now present the three main corollaries of Theorems 3.3 and 4.2 which bound the pseudo-dimension of several
auction classes of interest to the mechanism design community. In particular, we focus on “grand bundle” pricings
(Corollary 4.3), where each bidder in turn is offered the entire set of items [k] at some price, “item pricings” (Corol-
lary 4.4), where each bidder in turn is offered all remaining items and each item j has some price for purchasing it,
and “second-price item auctions with reserves” (Corollary 4.5), where each bidder submits a bid for each item j, and
item j is sold to the highest bidder for j at the larger of the item’s reserve price and the second-highest bid for that
item. Each of these auctions have two versions: the anonymous version, where the relevant design parameters are the
same for all bidders, and the non-anonymous version, where those parameters can be bidder-specific. As one would
suspect, anonymous pricings have fewer degrees of freedom, and have lower pseudo-dimension. More formally, the
allocations which come from anonymous pricings can be formulated as n-wise repeated allocations, while we for-
mulate non-anonymous pricings’ allocations as n-wise sequential allocations (which, by Theorem 4.2 loses a factor
of n in the upper bound on these classes’ pseudo-dimensions). In each case, F1 will represent allocation functions:
f1 ∈ F1 corresponds to the allocation function which the auction will implement for quasilinear bidders. For every
class F , we define for every auction f ∈ F the function f2 to be the revenue function, which as a function of an
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allocation and the valuation profile outputs the revenue for that auction with that allocation for that valuation profile.
The decomposition of F into F1,F2 is trivial; the work comes in showing that F1 is linearly separable and F2|f1 has
small pseudo-dimensions.
Our first two results use the framework to that grand bundle pricings and item pricings have small pseudo-
dimension. The second case requires a more delicate treatment of the valuation profiles (buyers are now choosing
arbitrary subsets of items, and will choose utility-maximizing bundles based on the per-item prices). It also requires
us to consider a larger set of intermediate labels (the set of all possible allocations grows to [n]k from [n]).
Corollary 4.3 Let F be the class of anonymous grand bundle pricings. Then,
PD(F) = O(1).
If F is the class of non-anonymous grand bundle pricings, then
PD(F) = O(n log n).
Corollary 4.4 Let F be the class of anonymous item pricings. Then,
PD(F) = O
(
k2
)
.
If F is the class of nonanonymous item pricings, then
PD(F) = O
(
nk2 ln(n)
)
.
Finally, we present our final application of this technique, and bound the pseudo-dimension of the class of second-
price item auctions with (non-anonymous) item reserves. A result of Yao (2015) implies this class has small repre-
sentation error for additive buyers; Corollary 4.5 shows it also has small generalization error. We briefly note that we
have a slightly tighter bound on this class’s pseudo-dimension, using a stylized argument found in Appendix D.
Corollary 4.5 Suppose V is some set of additive valuations. Let F be the class of second-price item auctions with
anonymous reserves. Then,
PD(F) = O
(
k2
)
.
If F is the class of second-price item auctions with nonanonymous reserves, then
PD(F) = O
(
nk2 ln(n)
)
.
Proof: We will show that for both classes, F1 is linearly separable (in k and nk dimensions, respectively). We do this
by showing that the anonymous class’s’ allocations can be described as n-wise anonymous sequential allocations and
the nonanonymous class’s allocations as n-wise nonanonymous sequential allocations from some class of single-buyer
allocation rules H which is k-dimensionally linearly separable. The natural candidate for H is the set of allocations
defined by item pricings, which we showed in the proof of Corollary 4.4 is linearly separable in k dimensions.
The fact that F1’s feasible allocations can be described as n-wise anonymous and nonanonymous sequential al-
locations over (single buyer) item pricings is not immediately obvious: a player’s price for an item j is not just the
item’s reserve price, but the maximum of that reserve and the second-highest bid for j. Thus, a buyer maximizing her
quasilinear utility with respect to her reserves would not necessarily purchase the same bundle as when facing item
prices which are the larger of her reserve and the second-highest bid for the item, even if she is the highest bidder
for each item. However, since the valuations are additive, i∗j the highest bidder for j will maximize her utility by
purchasing item j if vi∗j (j) ≥ pj , since vi∗j (j) ≥ maxi′ 6=i∗j vi′(j) implies vi∗j (j) ≥ max
(
pj ,maxi′ 6=i∗j vi′(j)
)
, and
an additive bidder will buy any item j for which her value for that item is (weakly) higher than the price for that item.
Thus, the utility-maximizing bundle for some i with respect to her item prices over the set of bundles for which she
only wins items for which she is the highest bidder will also be utility-maximizing for an additive bidder needing to pay
max(pj ,maxi′ 6=i∗j vi′(j) for each j. Remark 3.4 implies that we need only show linear separability over Qv for each
v ∈ Vn, where Qv = {f1(v)|fi ∈ F1,v ∈ Vn} is the range that the allocation rules might have for a particular v.
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Thus, since this class only sells j to the highest bidder for j, we need only show linear separability over allocations for
good j is either unallocated or sold to the highest bidder for j. Thus, the allocation for each bidder i will be correctly
predicted by the item pricing linear separator (over the label space which only has highest bidders winning items).
Thus, by Theorem 4.2, the second-price item auctions with anonymous item reserves is linearly separable in k+1
dimensions, and with nonanonymous reserves in n(k + 1) dimensions. We will now show that for both classes, for
any f ∈ F and corresponding f1 ∈ F1, the class F2|f1 has pseudo-dimension O˜(k) and O˜(nk), respectively.
First, fix F to be the set of the second-price item auctions with anonymous item reserves and pick some f1 ∈ F1.
Then, for each f ′2 ∈ F2|f1 and each vt ∈ S, we have
f ′2(v
t) = f2(f1(v
t),vt) =
∑
j
max(pfj ,max
i′ 6=i∗j
vti′({j})) · f1(v
t)j .
For each item j, suppose the relative ordering of pfj and maxi′ 6=i∗j v
t
i′ ({j}) were fixed. Then, f ′2(vt) is just a linear
function in k dimensions of vt and pf , which have pseudo-dimension at most k + 1, and therefore can induce at
most mk+1 labelings with respect to (r1, . . . , rm). There are m+ 1 possible relative orderings of these parameters,
or (m + 1)k for all items simultaneously. Thus, in total, there can be at most mk+1 · (m + 1)k labelings of S with
respect to (r1, . . . , rm) by F2|f1 , so PD(F2|f1) = O(k ln(k)).
The proof that non-anonymous item reserves has pseudo-dimension O(nk ln(nk)) is analogous, with a few small
exceptions. First, we consider those pf ∈ Rnk with a fixed ordering of (for all j ∈ [k]) the parameters {pfij |i ∈ [n]}
and the set {vti′j ({j})|t ∈ [m]}; there are therefore
(
mn
n
)
of these relative orderings for a fixed item, or O((mn)nk)
over all items. Fixing this ordering, the revenue on each sample is again a linear function (in nk dimensions) of vt,pf
for each vt. Thus, F2|f1 can induce at most mnk+1 · (mn)nk many labelings of S w.r.t. (r1, . . . , rm), implying
PD(F2|f1) = O(nk ln(nk)).
Then, applying Theorem 3.3 to the two classes (which are (k, k log k)-factorable over Q ⊆ {0, 1}k, |Q| ≤ 2k
and (nk, nk ln(nk))-separable over Q ∈ [n]k) implies the pseudo-dimensions are at most O(k2) and O(nk2 ln(n)),
respectively. 
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A Open Problems
We propose the following open problems resulting from our work.
1. Is it possible to construct “compression-style” arguments which bound the pseudo-dimension of the revenue of
the class of item pricings for additive bidders which are tight (giving a bound of k and nk, as in Theorem D.1,
rather than k2 and nk2)?
2. For general or even subadditive valuations, do item pricings have pseudo-dimensionO(nk) or strictly larger?
3. Is it possible to frame the allocations which result from item pricings with item-specific reserves as n-fold
sequential allocation rules from some simple class, for general valuation functions? We were able to show it for
additive valuations, which allowed us to use the “trick” where the highest bidder for an item is willing to pay
anything less than her bid for that item (independent of other prices); thus, if she’s willing to pay the reserve,
by virtue of being the highest bidder for the item she’s willing to pay the second-highest bid as well. For more
general valuations, she may or may not optimize her utility by paying some combination of item prices and
second-highest bids for a bundle which was utility-optimal if she were only paying item prices.
4. Relatedly, what is the pseudo-dimension of second-price item auctions with item-specific reserves when bidders
have valuations which are more general than additive or unit-demand? One can use a proof similar to the proof
of Theorem D.1 to achieve a bound for unit-demand bidders, but what about for submodular or subadditive
bidders? It isn’t clear that the relative ordering of a small number of “relevant” parameters (such as per-item
price and per-bidder single-item values) of the auction and sample are sufficient to fix the most-preferred bundle
for each agent from a sample.
B Binary Labeled Learning
Suppose there is some domain V , and let c be some unknown target function c : V → {0, 1}, and some unknown
distribution D over V . We wish to understand how many labeled samples (v, c(v)), with v ∼ D, are necessary
and sufficient to be able to compute a cˆ which agrees with c almost everywhere with respect to D. The distribution-
independent sample complexity of learning c depends fundamentally on the “complexity” of the set of binary functions
F from which we are choosing cˆ. We review two standard complexity measures next.
Let N be a set of m samples from V . The set N is said to be shattered by F if, for every subset T ⊆ N , there is
some cT ∈ F such that cT (v) = 1 if v ∈ T and cT (v′) = 0 if v′ /∈ T . That is, ranging over all c ∈ F induces all
2|N | possible projections onto N . The VC dimension of F , denoted VC(F), is the size of the largest set S that can be
shattered by F .
Let errN (cˆ) = (
∑
v∈N |c(v)−cˆ(v)|)/|N | denote the empirical error of cˆ onN , and let err(cˆ) = Ev∼D[|c(v)−cˆ(v)|]
denote the true expected error of cˆ with respect to D. We say F is (ǫ, δ)-PAC learnable with sample complexity m if
there exists an algorithm A such that, for all distributions D and all target functions c ∈ F , when A is given a sample
S of size m, it produces some cˆ ∈ F such that err(cˆ) < ǫ, with probability 1 − δ over the choice of the sample. The
PAC sample complexity of a class F can be bounded as a polynomial function of VC(F), ǫ, and ln 1
δ
(Vapnik and
Chervonenkis, 1971); furthermore, any algorithm which (ǫ, δ)-PAC learns F over all distributions D must use nearly
as many samples to do so. The following theorem states this well-known result formally.7
Theorem B.1 (Upper bound (Hanneke, 2015), Lower bound, Corollary 5 of (Ehrenfeucht et al., 1989)) Suppose
F is a class of binary functions. Then, F can be (ǫ, δ)-PAC learned with a sample of size
m = O
(
VC(F) + ln 1
δ
ǫ
)
.
7The upper bound stated here is a quite recent result which removes a ln 1
ǫ
factor from the upper bound; a slightly weaker but long-standing
upper bound can be attributed to Vapnik and Kotz (1982).
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Furthermore, any (ǫ, δ)-PAC learning algorithm for F must have sample complexity
m = Ω
(
VC(F) + ln 1
δ
ǫ
)
.
There is a stronger sense in which a class F can be learned, called uniform learnability. This property implies
that, with a sufficiently large sample, the error of every c ∈ F on the sample is close to the true error of c. We say
F is (ǫ, δ)-uniformly learnable with sample complexity m if, for every distributions D, given a sample N of size m,
with probability 1 − δ, |errN (c) − err(c)| < ǫ for every c ∈ F . Notice that, if F is (ǫ, δ)-uniformly learnable with m
samples, then it is also (ǫ, δ)-PAC learnable with m samples. We now state a well-known upper bound on the uniform
sample complexity of a class as a function of its VC dimension.
Theorem B.2 (See, e.g. Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1971)) Suppose F is a class of binary functions. Then, F can
be (ǫ, δ)-uniformly learned with a sample of size
m = O
(
VC(F) ln 1
ǫ
+ ln 1
δ
ǫ2
)
.
C Formal Statements of Known Revenue Guarantees for Simple Mecha-
nisms
In various special cases, it has been shown that the aforementioned auctions earn a constant fraction of the optimal
revenue. All of these results rely on buyers’ valuations displaying some kind of independence across items: for additive
and unit-demand buyers, this just means that for all i, vi = (vi1, . . . , vik) ∼ D = D1× . . .Dk is drawn from a product
distribution. Under this assumption, Chawla et al. (2010) showed that individualized item pricings are sufficient to
earn a constant fraction of optimal revenue.
Theorem C.1 [Chawla et al. (2010)] Suppose each i ∈ [n] has a unit-demand valuation vi ∼ Di = (Di1×. . .×Dik).
Then, there exists some nonanonymous item pricing p ∈ Rkn such that
REV(p,D) ≥
1
10.67
REV(OPT).
For a single item-independent additive buyer, the better of the best item pricing and grand bundle pricing also earns
a constant fraction of optimal revenue for that setting (Babaioff et al., 2014).
Theorem C.2 [Babaioff et al. (2014)] Suppose there is a single buyer which has an additive valuation vi ∼ Di =
(Di1 × . . .×Dik). Then, for an item pricing p ∈ Rk and q a grand bundle price, q ∈ R
max(max
p∈Rk
REV(p,Di),max
q∈R
REV(q,Di)) ≥
1
6
REV(OPT,Di).
A recent result of Yao (2015) showed that one can reduce the problem of designing approximately optimal mech-
anisms for n additive buyers to the problem of designing approximately optimal mechanisms for each single additive
buyers, subject to selling each item to the highest bidder for that item (while losing a constant factor in terms of rev-
enue). When combined with the aforementioned result for a single additive bidder, this implies that the best of second
price item auctions with the best individualized item reserves and second price grand bundle auctions with the best
individualized bundle reserve, is also approximately revenue-optimal for n (non-identically distributed) buyers with
valuations which are independent across items.
Theorem C.3 [Applying Yao (2015) to Babaioff et al. (2014)] Suppose each buyer i ∈ [n] has an additive valuation
vi ∼ Di = (Di1 × . . .×Dik). Let sp for p ∈ Rkn represent the second-price item auction with reserve pij for buyer i
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and item j (and similarly, let sq for q ∈ Rn represent the second-price grand bundle auction with reserve qi for buyer
i). Then,
max( max
p∈Rkn
REV(sp,Di),max
q∈Rn
REV(sq,Di)) ≥
1
8
REV(OPT,Di).
The final well-known result for approximately optimal Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015), “simple” revenue-maximizing
mechanisms states that, for an appropriately generalized definition of valuations distributed “independently across
items”, one can approximately maximize revenue selling to a single subadditive buyer with item or grand bundle pric-
ings. We now present the formal definition of independence they use for these more complicated valuation functions,
and present their main result.
Definition C.4 (Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015)) A distribution D over valuation functions v : 2k → R is subad-
ditive over independent items if:
1. All v in the support of D are monotone; v(K ∪K ′) ≥ v(K) for all K,K ′.
2. All v in the support of D are subadditive: v(K ∪K ′) ≤ v(K) + v(K ′) for all K,K ′.
3. All v in the support of D exhibit no externalities: there exists some D~x over Rk and a function V such that D is
a distribution that samples ~x ∼ D~x and outputs v such that v(K) = V ({xκ}κ∈K ,K) for all K .
4. D~x is product across its k dimensions.
Theorem C.5 [Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015)] SupposeDi is subadditive over independent items. Then, there exists
a universal constant c ≥ 1 such that
max(max
p∈Rk
REV(p,Di),max
q∈R
REV(q,Di)) ≥
1
c
REV(OPT,Di).
D A tighter bound on the pseudo-dimension of second-price item auctions
with reserves for additive bidders
We now present a tighter analysis of second-price item auctions with reserves which exploits the total independence
of buyers’ behavior on items j, j′.
Theorem D.1 The pseudo-dimension of item auctions and second-price item auctions with anonymous item reserves
is O(k log k) and with nonanonymous item prices/reserves is O(nk log(nk)) when bidders are additive.
Proof: We present the proof for the class of second-price item auctions with item reserves; the item price result follows
easily since the winner for j always pays her item price (rather than the maximum of that and the second-highest bid
for j).
Rather than proving the allocation rules are linearly separable, we upper-bound the number of intermediate label-
ings these classes can induce form samples, where the intermediate label space we consider is the allocation combined
with, for each item, whether the winner for that item is paying the item’s reserve or second price for that item. Fix
some sample S = (v1, . . . ,vm) where vt ∈ Vn and (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ Rm.
This can be encoded in {0, 1}2k for anonymous item reserves (a bit for whether or not an item is sold at its reserve
and another for whether it is sold for its second-price), and {0, 1}2nk for nonanonymous reserves (where each item is
labeled as being allocated to some bidder, along with whether it is sold for that bidder’s item-specific reserve or the
second-highest bid). In the latter case, there is a post-processing rule which can reduce the label space to have size
O(n2k), since all allocations are feasible allocations. In both cases, we will use yt to denote the intermediate label for
sample vt.
We begin with anonymous item reserves. Since buyers are additive, we can consider each item separately. We
consider item j ∈ [k]. There are 2m+ 1 relevant quantities which affect the revenue any reserve achieves for item j:
15
pj , the reserve for j, and for each t ∈ [m], vti∗j ({j}) and v
t
i′j
({j}), where i∗j , i′j are the first and second highest bidders
for j from sample t, respectively. When pj ≤ vti′j ({j}), let y
t
j = 1 and ytk+j = 0, when vti∗j ({j}) ≥ pj > v
t
i′j
({j}), let
ytj = 0 and ytk+j = 1, and when pj > vti∗j ({j}), let y
t
j = y
t
n+j = 0. Thus, when the relative ordering of these 2m+ 1
parameters is fixed, the jth and n+ jth coordinates for all m samples are fixed. Varying pj can induce at most 2m+2
distinct labelings of all of S. Thus, for all k items, there are at most (2m+ 2)k distinct vectors (y1, . . . , yt).
Now, fix some intermediate labeling (y1, . . . , ym) of S. Then, the revenue for a particular reserve vector (p1, . . . , pk)
which induces this labeling on the sample is easy to describe as a linear of this labeling. Namely,
rev(vt,p, yt) =
∑
j:ytj=1
vti′j ({j}) +
∑
j:ytn+j=1
pj
which is a linear function in 2k dimensions of p and vt, yt (which are constants). Thus, since linear functions in 2k
dimensions have VC-dimension 2k + 1, the item reserves which agree with (y1, . . . , ym) can induce at most m2k+1
labelings of S with respect to (r1, . . . , rm).
Thus, the set of all item reserves can induce at most m2k+1 · (2m+ 2)k labelings with respect to (r1, . . . , rm), so
if S is shatterable it must be that 2m ≤ m2k+1 · (2m+ 2)k, or that m = O(k log k).
With nonanonymous reserves, each sample will instead be given an intermediate label in {0, 1}nk+k, where there is
a bit for each item/bidder pair (corresponding to whether or not that bidder wins the item and pays her individualized
reserve for the item), and an additional bit for each item (corresponding to whether or not that item is sold for its
second-highest bid). There are at most [n + 1]k valid labelings of a single sample (each item is sold to at most one
bidder, and is either sold to her at her reserve or at the second-highest price). For m samples, for a particular item j,
there are now 2m+n parameters whose ordering matters (the highest and second-highest bids and the bidder-specific
reserves for that item); the bidder-specific item reserves for that item can induce at most (2m+ n)n distinct orderings
of these parameters; fixing this ordering, the intermediate label is also fixed for all samples. Furthermore, once one
has fixed the intermediate label for all samples, the revenues of all individualized item reserve auctions which agree
with that intermediate labeling are again expressible as a linear function in 2nk dimensions. Thus, if the sample is
shatterable, 2m ≤ (2m+ n)nk ·m2nk, implying m = O(nk ln(nk)). 
E Omitted Proofs
Proof of Remark 3.4: For each x ∈ X, y ∈ Qx, there exists Ψ(x, y) and for f ∈ F1, some wf ∈ Rd such that
argmaxy∈QxΨ(x, y) · w
f = f(x).
We simply must extend the definition of Ψ(x, y) to be defined over all y ∈ Q
Ψ(x, y′) · wf < max
y∈Qx
Ψ(x, y) · wf
for y′ ∈ Q\Qx. Define Ψ(x, y′)t = 0 for any t /∈ T+, and Ψ(x, y′)t = −1 for all t ∈ T+. Then, for any y′ ∈ Q\Qx,
the dot product Ψ(x, y′) · wf < 0 ≥ maxy∈Qx Ψ(x, y) · wf , so the maximizing label y will still be in Qx. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Consider a sample S = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Xm of size m with targets r = (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ Rm.
We first claim that, since F1 is a-dimensionally linearly separable, F1 can label S in at most
(
m
a
)
· |Q|a distinct ways.
Theorem 2.5 implies that F1 must admit a compression scheme compress, decompress of size at most a. Let f1(S)
denote the labeling of all of S by some fixed f1 ∈ F1. Then, F1 can label S in at most |rangef1∈F1(decompress ◦
compress)(S, f1(S))| ways since this is a compression scheme for F1. The decompression function takes as input a
labeled examples which are a subset of S, so it will have one of
(
m
a
)
· |Q|a inputs for a fixed set S (some subset of
S labeled in some arbitrary way), and therefore at most that many outputs, which upper-bounds the total number of
possible labelings of S by the same quantity.
Then, fixing the labeling of S to be consistent with some f1 ∈ F1, we know that the pseudo-dimension of F2|f1 is
at most b, so it can induce at most mb many labelings of S according to r. Thus, there are at most ma|Q|amb binary
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labelings of S with respect to r over all of F2 (and, therefore over all of F ). If S is shatterable, it must be that
2m ≤ ma|Q|amb
implying m ≤ (a+ b) ln(m) + a ln |Q|, as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2: In either case, Q is a set of feasible allocations, so we only must show linear separability over
the set of feasible allocations (that is, we need only show separability over labels B : Bi ∩Bj = ∅).
We start with the first case of sequential allocations. We will show that F1 is an-dimensionally linearly sepa-
rable. By definition, F1 is a set of n-wise sequential allocations from some H which is a-dimensionally linearly
separable over {0, 1}k. This means there exists some Ψ : (V × {0, 1}k) × {0, 1}k → Ra, wh ∈ Rd such that
argmaxBΨ((v,X), B) · wh = h(v,X) for all h ∈ H, (v,X) ∈ V × {0, 1}k.
We simply need to construct some new Ψˆ : Vn ×Q→ Ran, wˆh1,...,hn ∈ Ran such that
argmax
B=(B1...Bn)
Ψˆ(v,B) · wˆh1,...,hn = (h1(v1, X1(v)), h2(v2, X2(v)), . . . , hn(vn, Xn(v))).
Define αi = 2iH , and define
Ψ((v,B)ij = αi ·Ψ((vi, [k] \ ∪i′<iBi′)Bi)j
Then, for some
∏
(h1,...,hn)
∈ F1, define
wˆh1,...,hnij = w
hi
j
Now, inspecting the dot product for some v,B we see
Ψˆ(v,B) · wˆh1,...,hn =
∑
i
αiΨ((vi, [k] \ ∪i′<iBi′),Bi) · w
hi
which, by the definition of αi and the assumption that Ψ((vi, X), B) · wh ≤ H for all vi, X,B, h ∈ H implies that
the maximizing label B will first pick B1 ⊆ [k] = X1(v) to maximize Ψ((v1, X1(v)),B1) · wh1 , then will pick
B2 ⊆ [k] \ B1 = X2(v) to maximize Ψ((v2, X2(v)),B2) · wh2 , and so on. Thus, F1 is an-dimensionally linearly
separable.
Now, suppose F1 is a set of n-wise repeated allocations. Since H is a-dimensionally linearly separable, we know
that for all v,X,Bi, there exists Ψ((vi, X), Bi), and for all h ∈ H there is some wh such that
argmaxBiΨ((vi, X), Bi) · w
h = h(vi, X).
We simply need to define some Ψˆ : Vn ×Q→ Ra, wˆh ∈ Ra such that
argmax
B
Ψˆ(v,B) · wˆh = (h(v1, X1(v)), h(v2, X2(v)), . . . , h(vn, Xn(v))).
Then, define
Ψˆ(v,B)x =
∑
i
αi ·Ψ((vi, [k] \ ∪i′<iBi′),Bi)x
Then, for some
∏
h,...,h) ∈ F1, define
wˆhx = w
h
x
Then, the dot product
Ψ(v,B) · wˆh =
∑
x
∑
i
αi ·Ψ((vi, [k] \ ∪i′<iBi′),Bi)x · w
h
x =
∑
i
αi ·Ψ((vi, [k] \ ∪i′<iBi′),Bi) · w
h,
which by the definition of αi and the guaranteed upper bound on the dot product Ψ · wh ≤ H , we know will be
maximized by first picking some B1 ⊆ [k] = X1(v) which maximizes Ψ((v1, X1(v)),B1) · wh, then picking
B2 ⊆ X1(v) \ h(v1, X1(v)) = X2(v) which maximizes Ψ((v2, X2(v)), B2) · wh, and so on. Thus, F1 is a-
dimensionally linearly separable. 
17
Proof of Corollary 4.3: We first prove first that for a single buyer, the grand-bundle mechanism is 2-dimensionally
linearly separable over {0, 1}. Let H denote the class of single-buyer grand bundle pricings. For some h ∈ H, we
define h1 : V → {0, 1} as h1(v) = I[v ≥ ph], where ph ∈ R represents the price of the grand bundle under h. We will
show H is 2-dimensionally linearly separable over {0, 1}. Define Ψ(v, b) = I[b = 1](v([k]), 1) for each b ∈ {0, 1}
and wh = (1,−ph). Then,
argmaxbΨ(v, b) · wh = argmaxbI[b = 1](v([k]− pf ) = I[v ≥ ph] = f1(v)
since the penultimate expression is maximized by b = 1 only if v([k]) ≥ pf . Thus, H is 2-dimensionally separable.
Notice that when F is the set of anonymous grand bundle pricings, its allocation rules F1 are n-fold repeated
allocations from H. Thus, by Theorem 4.2, anonymous grand bundle pricings’ allocations are linearly separable in 2
dimensions. The obvious intermediate label space Q = {~0} ∪ {ei|i ∈ [n]}, the set of standard basis vectors, contains
more information than is needed to compute the revenue of these auctions. Define q(x) = I[||x|| > 0]; Observation 1
implies that F ′1 = q ◦F1 is 2-dimensionally linearly separable overQ′ = {0, 1}. Now we prove for each f1 ∈ F ′1 that
F2|f1 has pseudo-dimensionO(1). Fix some f1 ∈ F ′1. Then, we have that
f ′2(v) = f2(f1(v),v) = p
f · f1(v)
so, the class F2|f1 is a class of linear functions in 1 dimensions, which have pseudo-dimension at most 2. Thus, F is
(2, 2)-factorable over {0, 1}, and Theorem 3.3 implies that the pseudo-dimension of anonymous grand bundle pricings
is O(1).
Similarly, when F is the the set of non-anonymous grand bundle pricings, F1 are n-fold sequential allocations
from H. Thus, these allocation rules are 2n-dimensionally linearly separable, respectively. In this case, we leave
the intermediate label space as Q = {~0} ∪ {ei|i ∈ [n]}. For any f ∈ F , let pf ∈ Rn denote the price vector
for the grand bundle, that is pfi is i’s price for purchasing the grand bundle. Fix some f1 ∈ F1; we claim that
F2|f1 has pseudo-dimension O(n). For any f ′2 ∈ F2 and any f which is decomposed into (f1, f2) , we have that
f ′2(v) = f2(f1(v),v) = p
f · f1(v), which again is a linear function when f1 is fixed, in this case in n dimensions.
Thus, F is (2n, n)-factorable over Q, so Theorem 3.3 implies that the pseudo-dimension of nonanonymous grand
bundle pricings is O(n log n). 
Proof of Corollary 4.4: As in the previous proof, we claim that F1, the allocation rules of these auctions are n-wise
repeated allocations and n-wise sequential allocations from the single-buyer item pricings allocation set H. We begin
by showing H is k + 1-dimensionally linearly separable. For some h ∈ H, let ph ∈ Rn denote the item pricing faced
by the single buyer. Then, define for v ∈ V , B ∈ {0, 1}k,
Ψ(v,B)j =
{
I[j ∈ B] if j ∈ [k]
v(B) if j = k + 1
and for h ∈ H, define
whj =
{
−phj if j ∈ [k]
1 if j = k + 1 .
Then, we have that Ψ(v,B) · wh = v(B) −
∑
j∈B p
h
j , which will be maximized by B which maximizes v’s utility.
Thus, h(v) = argmaxBv(B)−
∑
j∈B p
h
j = argmaxBΨ(v,B) · wh, so H is k + 1-dimensionally linearly separable.
ConsiderF the class of anonymous item prices. Theorem 4.2 implies that this class is k+1-dimensionally linearly
separable over Q = [n]k. Again, the intermediate label space suggested by this reduction to the single-buyer case,
Q = [n]k, is larger than necessary to compute revenue. We define q(B)j = I[j ∈ ∪iBi], and by Observation 1,
F ′1 = q ◦ F1 is k+1-dimensionally linearly separable over Q′ = {0, 1}k. We now show that, for a fixed f1 ∈ F1, the
class F2|f1 has pseudo-dimensionO(k). Notice that for any f ′2 ∈ F2|f1 , we have that
f ′2(v) = f2(f1(v),v) = p
f · f1(v)
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which, again is a k-dimensional linear function for some fixed f1, and therefore has pseudo-dimension at most k + 1.
Thus, the class F can be (k + 1, k + 1)-factored over {0, 1}k, and Thereof 3.3 implies the pseudo-dimension is thus
at most O(k2).
The proof for the nonanonymous case is identical, with two changes. First, F1 is a set of n-wise nonanonymous
sequential allocations, so it is linearly separable in n(k+1) dimensions. Second, we cannot compress the intermediate
label space Q ⊂ {0, 1}nk, |Q| ≤ [n]k, since f ′2(v) = f2(f1(v),v) = pf · f1(v) only expresses the revenue of the
auction if f1(v) expresses which buyers purchase which items; thus, the set F2|f1 has pseudo-dimension at most
O(nk). Thus, the class F can be (O(nk), O(nk))-factored over Q with |Q| ≤ [n]k, and Thereof 3.3 implies the
pseudo-dimension is thus at most O(nk2 ln(n)). 
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